### Economic collapses have empirically give rise to rapid periods of economic growth.

Mead, 9 – Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations

(Walter Russell, “Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, 2/4/09,

<http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2>)

Even before the Panic of 2008 sent financial markets into turmoil and launched what looks like the worst global recession in decades, talk of American decline was omnipresent. In the long term, the United States faces the rise of Asia and the looming fiscal problems posed by Medicare and other entitlement programs. In the short term, there is a sense that, after eight years of George W. Bush, the world, full of disdain for our way of life, seems to be spinning out of our--and perhaps anybody's--control. The financial panic simply brought all that simmering anxiety to a boil, and the consensus now seems to be that the United States isn't just in danger of decline, but in the full throes of it--the beginning of a "post-American" world.

Perhaps--but the long history of capitalism suggests another possibility. After all, capitalism has seen a steady procession of economic crises and panics, from the seventeenth-century Tulip Bubble in the Netherlands and the Stop of the Exchequer under Charles II in England through the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles of the early eighteenth century, on through the crises associated with the Napoleonic wars and the spectacular economic crashes that repeatedly wrought havoc and devastation to millions throughout the nineteenth century. The panics of 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907 were especially severe, culminating in the Great Crash of 1929, which set off a depression that would not end until World War II. The series of crises continued after the war, and the last generation has seen the Penn Central bankruptcy in 1970, the first Arab oil crisis of 1973, the Third World debt crisis of 1982, the S&L crisis, the Asian crisis of 1997, the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001, and today's global financial meltdown.

And yet, this relentless series of crises has not disrupted the rise of a global capitalist system, centered first on the power of the United Kingdom and then, since World War II, on the power of the United States. After more than 300 years, it seems reasonable to conclude that financial and economic crises do not, by themselves, threaten either the international capitalist system or the special role within it of leading capitalist powers like the United Kingdom and the United States. If anything, the opposite seems true--that financial crises in some way sustain Anglophone power and capitalist development.

Indeed, many critics of both capitalism and the "Anglo-Saxons" who practice it so aggressively have pointed to what seems to be a perverse relationship between such crises and the consolidation of the "core" capitalist economies against the impoverished periphery. Marx noted that financial crises remorselessly crushed weaker companies, allowing the most successful and ruthless capitalists to cement their domination of the system. For dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch, crises served a similar function in the international system, helping stronger countries marginalize and impoverish developing ones.

Setting aside the flaws in both these overarching theories of capitalism, this analysis of economic crises is fundamentally sound--and especially relevant to the current meltdown. Cataloguing the early losses from the financial crisis, it's hard not to conclude that the central capitalist nations will weather the storm far better than those not so central. Emerging markets have been hit harder by the financial crisis than developed ones as investors around the world seek the safe haven provided by U.S. Treasury bills, and commodity-producing economies have suffered extraordinary shocks as commodity prices crashed from their record, boom-time highs. Countries like Russia, Venezuela, and Iran, which hoped to use oil revenue to mount a serious political challenge to American power and the existing world order, face serious new constraints. Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chavez, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad must now spend less time planning big international moves and think a little bit harder about domestic stability. Far from being the last nail in America's coffin, the financial crisis may actually resuscitate U.S. power relative to its rivals

The biggest loser of the financial crisis thus far seems to have been Russia, a country that stormed into 2008 breathing fire and boasting of its renewed great-power status. After years of military decline, it put its strategic bombers back in the air; sent its fleet to the Caribbean; and reintroduced displays of martial power to Kremlin parades. Petrodollars filled government coffers, and political dissent at home had largely disappeared. Russia's troubles had been eased by the effective suppression of the Chechen insurgency, while America's troubles remained severe, with the U.S. military mired in two wars. When its troops invaded Georgia, Russia seemed once again to be acting like a great power--and not a very nice one.

### Statistical models prove growth solves for the environment

Tierney 9 (John, science columnist for the New York Times, journalism degree from Yale U, cites Nobel Prize winning economist Simon Kuznets, Ph.D from Columbia U, Apr 20, [tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/the-richer-is-greener-curve/] AD: 6-21-11, jm)

In my Findings column, I explain how researchers have discovered that, over the long term, being richer often translates into being greener. Many environmental problems get worse as a country first industrializes, but once it reaches a certain level of income, the trend often reverses, producing a curve shaped like an upside-down U. It’s called a Kuznets curve (in honor of the economist Simon Kuznets, who detected this pattern in trends of income inequality). As promised in the column, here are some graphic examples of Kuznets curves for sulphur dioxide pollution, as measured in an assortment of rich and poor countries, and also as measured over time in the United States. Each line is an environmental Kuznets curve for a group of countries during the 1980s. The levels of sulphur dioxide pollution (the vertical axis) rise as countries becomes more affluent (the horizontal axis). But then, once countries reach an economic turning point (a gross domestic product close to $8,000 per capita), the trend reverses and air pollution declines as countries get richer. In this analysis by Xiang Dong Qin of Clemson University, the green line shows countries with strong protections for property rights; the red curve shows countries with weaker protections. I’m not trying to argue that all environmental problems fit these curves, or that these improvements happen automatically. How fast the environment improves depends not just on money but on whether a country has an effective government, educated citizens, healthy institutions and the right laws. (For discussions of the variability of these curves and the factors that affect them, see this PERC report by a group led by Bruce Yandle of Clemson University and this article in Environment, Development and Sustainability by Kuheli Dutt of Northeastern University.) But rising incomes can make it more likely that improvements will come, and these Kuznets curves give more reason for optimism than the old idea that economic growth endangered the planet. In the 1970s, rich countries were urged to “de-develop” by Paul Ehrlich and John P. Holdren, now the White House science adviser. I welcome your thoughts on what can be learned from Kuznets curves — and whether people at opposite ends of the curves can find common ground. As America got richer in the the 20th century, emissions of sulphur dioxide rose. But thanks to new technologies, new laws and new desires for cleaner air, the trend reversed, and sulphur-dioxide pollution declined even though population and wealth kept rising.

### Kondratieff wave theory fails – creator even admits the theory is false

North 09 (Gary, economist and publisher and PhD in history from the University of California, Riverside, The Myth of the Kondratieff Wave, http://www.lewrockwell.com/north/north725.html, 6/27/09, AD: 7/6/09) JC

Kondratieff admitted that there was no theoretical basis for his cycle. He also admitted that some of the price data revealed no traces in his cycle. He selected two groups of "elements of economic reality," as he called them. This is from [The Long Wave Cycle](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0943940079?ie=UTF8&tag=lewrockwell&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=0943940079) (Richardson & Snyder, 1984). The elements of the first group were characterized by the fact that, along with the fluctuating processes, their dynamic did not manifest any general growth or decline (secular trend), or else that trend was scarcely noticeable – at any rate, for the period under observation (p. 33). What was he talking about? For one thing, commodity prices. He admitted: "In processing the statistics on the dynamics of the series of this group, I used simple analytical methods to bring out the long cycles" (p. 33). In short, he manipulated the evidence until he obtained a pattern. He said he found patterns in other statistics. But was there an underlying economic reality, "some real trends in economic development? This is a very big question, and I cannot now elucidate it." Yet this is the heart of his supposed cycle. "We do not have a method for determining how accurately a theoretical curve reflects real evolutionary-economic trends" (p. 35). All that he could find in the pig iron and lead statistics was one and a half or maybe two cycles (p. 52). . . . we did not succeed at all if finding long cycles in the dynamics of cotton consumption in France, and wool and sugar production in the United States, or in the dynamics of certain other series (p. 58). As has already been noted, in my own investigation I discovered series in whose dynamics there were no long cycles (p. 62). As for the pattern of the long cycle, First, I emphasize its empirical character: as such, it is lacking in precision and certainly allows of exceptions. Second, in presenting it I am absolutely disinclined to believe that it offers any explanation of the causes of the long cycles (pp. 68–69). He was frank about the extreme limitations on his data and his findings. His disciples are not.

#### Silver’s model is too conservative for now – doesn’t take into account debates

Silver 10/5 (http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/oct-5-day-after-debate-strong-swing-state-polls-for-romney/)

My subjective view is that, despite the somewhat mixed messages that the polls gave about the magnitude of Mr. Romney’s bounce, this is still too conservative. The forecast model is pretty “smart” about distinguishing random movements in the polls from real ones, and so can be fairly conservative in interpreting the data. However, it does not have the advantage of knowing that the shifts may have come for a good reason — in this case, Mr. Romney’s strong performance in the debate.¶ So I would bet on Mr. Romney right now given the odds the model offers — but I’d have done so more confidently before the morning’s jobs report.¶ It’s going to take a few more days for the forecast model to catch up to the news, and I don’t think there’s any alternative but to keep an open mind about the polls for right now.

#### Romney will win – best models

Anas 10-4 (Brittany, CU-Boulder prof's updated forecast still gives win to Mitt Romney, Times Call, 4 October 2012, http://www.timescall.com/news/longmont-local-news/ci\_21698333/cu-boulder-profs-updated-forecast-still-gives-win, da 10-5-12)

President Barack Obama is expected to receive 208 votes, which is down five from the initial prediction that the professors announced on Aug. 22.¶ Bickers said that economic conditions continue to favor Romney, even though many polls are showing the president in the lead.¶ Bickers recalled that incumbent Jimmy Carter led Ronald Reagan in the polls well into October during the 1980 election that Reagan ended up winning in a landslide.¶ The model developed by Bickers and Berry is based on the Electoral College and, they say, it is the only one of its type to include more than one state-level measure of economic conditions. To make their predictions, the professors comb economic data from all 50 states and the District of Columbia.¶ The professors' model includes state and national unemployment figures as well as changes in income.

#### Nevada is key to the election

Baca and Zamora 12 (Nathan, Investigate reporter for 8 News Now Las Vegas, Mark, photojournalist, http://www.8newsnow.com/story/19299409/fla-sen-rubio-vegas-ryan-medicare-plan, I-Team: Fla. Sen. Rubio in Vegas, Talks Ryan Medicare Plan)

LAS VEGAS -- Nevada once again proves to be a key battleground state in November's general election as candidate visits have become a weekly event in Las Vegas.¶ On Thursday, Republican Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida rallied volunteers at the Venetian on the Las Vegas Strip.¶ This was a sort of homecoming for Rubio. Although he was born in Miami, Rubio spent several of his childhood years in Las Vegas. He told a crowd of hundreds about his parents working at Las Vegas casinos.¶ But he also told them the fate of Medicare rests with this election.¶ Rubio stood alongside Nevada Sen. Dean Heller where hundreds of supporters came to see Rubio, a Cuban-American and one of the Senate's youngest members.¶ Rubio spoke about presumed Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney and vice presidential running mate Paul Ryan's plan for Medicare.